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EXPANDING THE P-4 TRADE AGREEMENT
INTO A BROADER TRANS-PACIFIC




In 2005, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei enter into
a path-breaking free trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement which also is also known as the
P-4 Agreement. The agreement contains an open accession
provision which explicitly contemplates the expansion of the
agreement to include other countries willing to commit to its terms.
The expansion of the agreement has important implications for the
world trading system. Its broad coverage and open accession
provision may suggest that the agreement has the potential to serve
as a stepping stone in the path towards further multilateral trade
liberalization in the WTO context. On the other hand, the
expanding of the agreement may make the agreement so powerful
that its members no longer consider devoting energies to
liberalizing in the WTO context to be of great importance. The
article explores some of the unique aspects of the TPP as well as
the potential implications of expanding the agreement, both of the
East Asian region and for the broader multilateral trading system.
* Senior Lecturer and Co-Director, New Zealand Centre of International Economic Law at Victoria
University of Wellington Law School. The author can be reached at meredith.lewis@vuw.ac.nz.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, four countries from different comers of the globe entered into
a unique and potentially path-breaking free trade agreement. The Trans-
Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, also known as the P-4
Agreement, comprises New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei. The
agreement is notable not only for its geographic diversity but also for the
comprehensiveness and depth of its coverage. In addition, the agreement
contains an open accession provision which explicitly contemplates the
expansion of the agreement to include other countries willing to commit to
its terms. This expansion potential may soon become a reality. In 2008, the
P-4 Agreement member countries entered into preliminary negotiations
with the United States that were intended to lay the groundwork for the
United States' ultimate accession to the Agreement. Shortly after these
negotiations commenced, it was announced that Australia and Peru also
intend to join the agreement. More recently Vietnam has been identified as
an additional planned participant. Other countries have also signalled
interest in joining an expanded version of the agreement, which is now
being referred to as the TPP.' The expansion of the TPP has important
implications for the world trading system. It may serve as the template for a
much larger FrA, perhaps even for an ultimate free trade area of the Asia-
Pacific. In addition, its broad coverage and open accession provision may
suggest that the agreement has the potential to serve as a stepping stone
rather than a stumbling block in the path towards further multilateral trade
liberalization in the WTO context. On the other hand, should the agreement
expand to encompass a very significant percentage of world trade, it may
become so powerful that its members no longer consider devoting energies
to liberalizing in the WTO context to be of great importance. This article
explores some of the unique aspects of the TPP as well as the potential
implications of expanding the agreement, both for the East Asian region
and for the broader multilateral trading system.
II.THE TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT: A UNIQUE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
What is now known as the Trans-Pacific SEP or P-4 Agreement began
with negotiations launched by Chile, New Zealand and Singapore at the
APEC leaders' summit in 2002. These original negotiations contemplated
an agreement amongst the three participating countries, to be known as the
Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3 CEP). However, Brunei
In this article the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement in its current
composition will be referred to as the P-4 Agreement. The proposed expanded version of that
agreement to include, inter alia, the United States, will be referred to as the TPP.
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attended a number of rounds as an observer, and ultimately joined the
,, 2Agreement as a "founding member' . The Agreement was signed by New
Zealand, Chile and Singapore on July 18, 2005 and by Brunei on August 2,
2005, following the conclusion of negotiations in June 2005. A binding
Environment Cooperation Agreement and a binding Labour Cooperation
Memorandum of Understanding, which had been negotiated as part of the
Trans-Pacific package, were signed concurrently. 3 Following the passage of
implementing legislation and related regulations, the Agreement entered
into force for New Zealand and Singapore on May 1, 2006 and for Chile on
November 8, 2006. Brunei deposited an instrument of provisional
application on May 12, 2006 and the Agreement has provisionally applied
to Brunei since June 12, 2006. 4 The P-4 Agreement is the first multi-party
free trade agreement linking Asia, the Pacific and Latin America.5
The P-4 Agreement liberalises and facilitates trade in goods and
services and promotes cooperation on a range of areas of mutual economic
interest. 6 The Agreement is comprehensive in scope, including rules to
determine which goods qualify for tariff preferences (rules of origin);
measures relating to customs procedures (chapter 5), trade remedies
(chapter 6), sanitary and phytosanitary procedures (chapter 7), technical
barriers to trade (chapter 8), competition policy (chapter 9), intellectual
property (chapter 10), and government procurement (chapter 11). It also
includes broad coverage of services (chapter 12) and a dispute settlement
chapter (chapter 15). 7 For disputes arising under both the WTO and the P-4,
the agreement provides a complaining party with the choice of bringing the
dispute before the WTO or of initiating dispute settlement (in the form of
arbitration) under the FTA. The agreement precludes recourse to both
methods of dispute settlement one after the other - a party must choose its
2 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, History of the Trans-Pacific SEP Agreement
P4, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/0-
history.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).3 id.
4 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement Between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore,
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-RelationsfTrade-Agreements/Trans-
Pacific/index.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership Agreement].
sNEW ZEALAND MINIsTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, THE NEw ZEALAND-SINGAPORE-
CHILE-BRUNEI DARUSSALAM TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 8 (1991)
[hereinafter TRANS-PAC1FIC BOOKLET], available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-
agreement/transpacific/trans-pacificbooklet.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). All of the parties to
the P-4 Agreement are members of the APEC.
6 Bmnei was given some flexibility to implement its commitments in light of its late entry into the
negotiation process. For example, it was given more time to negotiate its services and government
procurement schedules. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 4.
7 TRANS-PACIFIC BOOKLET, supra note 5.
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forum and is thereafter not permitted to bring the same dispute before the
alternate forum.
While the initial agreement did not include chapters on investment or
financial services, it provided that negotiations in these areas would
commence two years after the agreement came into force. These
negotiations were duly initiated in 2008 and it was these negotiations that
the United States initially sought to, and ultimately did join.
The P-4 is what many would consider a "high standards" agreement in
that the breadth of subject coverage is broad, and the extent of
commitments is deep. Unlike many FTAs, the P-4 does not have any major
sectoral exclusions, providing comprehensive coverage even for sectors
many countries protect such as agriculture. Instead, the agreement provides
for the removal of all tariffs applied by any of the members with respect to
products being imported from any other P-4 member. Most tariffs were
lowered to zero upon the entry into force of the Agreement; 8 with any
remaining tariffs to be reduced to zero by 2017.
Notwithstanding the broad coverage, the parties have provided for a
fairly broad set of exceptions provisions. In addition to importing the
GAT[ Article XX exemptions wholesale into the agreement, the agreement
provides that these exceptions are applicable not just in the traditional
goods context, but also to the chapters on, inter alia, trade remedies,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade. The P-
4 also provides, as do most of New Zealand's FTAs, an exception that
allows New Zealand to discriminate in favour of its indigenous Maori
population if necessary to fulfil New Zealand's obligations pursuant to the
Treaty of Waitangi.9 There is also a broader cultural exception than that
provided for in GATT Article XX."°
While the P-4 Agreement is comprehensive in its scope, particularly
now that the financial services and investment negotiations have taken
place, it is unique more for its structure than its content. First, although all
of the participants are members of APEC, the Agreement is decidedly not
regional in nature. By drawing together members from all across the globe
the Agreement establishes strategic linkages across the Pacific, joining
Latin America, South East Asia, and Oceania. To be sure, the participating
economies are not especially large; however, the alliance is far more
important and relevant strategically than as a means for generating
8 TRANS-PACIFIC BOOKLET, supra note 5, at 18. Singapore and New Zealand had already removed
all tariffs on goods traded bilaterally as a result of the New Zealand and Singapore Closer
Economic Partnership formed in 2001.
9 The Treaty of Waitangi was entered into between representatives of the British Crown and the
various Maori iwi (tribes) present in New Zealand in 1840.
10 Brunei is availing itself of the moral, health and security exceptions to maintain tariffs on a short
list of products including alcohol, tobacco and firearms. TRANS-PACIFIC BOOKLET, supra note 5, at
18 n.2.
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economic synergies amongst the member countries. From a strategic
standpoint however, the Agreement, along with its labour and
environmental provisions, is seen within APEC as a model for a broader
APEC-wide agreement.' 1
In addition to the strategic selection of participating countries, the P-4
Agreement is also relatively unusual amongst free trade agreements in that
it is open to accession "on terms to be agreed among the parties, by any
APEC economy or other state". 12 This "open accession" provision thus
provides the opportunity for interested countries not currently party to the
agreement to be able to negotiate with the current members with an eye
towards joining into the agreement. This provision further positions the P-4
Agreement to serve as a potential model or template for a Free Trade Area
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).
Previously, it has been assumed that efforts to attain an FFAAP would
require either a large-scale negotiation amongst all APEC members to
amalgamate the various existing bilateral agreements or that a particular
style of free trade agreement would need to be accepted as the model for all
of APEC. Neither of these paths has appeared particularly likely to bear
fruit. There is no consensus amongst APEC members that an FTAAP is
even desirable, and merging the various regional FTAs into one agreement
would be quite challenging given the different rules of origin, sectoral
exclusions, and differences in scope.' 3 And the United States, Japan, and
China have all pursued distinct styles of FTAs, making it unlikely that one
of these would emerge as the clear favored choice of APEC members.
14
However, the expansion of the P-4 is poised to proceed according to a
different path - by the incremental addition of interested countries. This
methodology - which is possible due to the P-4 Agreement's open
accession provision - avoids the problems of the above-mentioned paths
11 TRANS-PACFIC BOOKLET, supra note 5, at 13. In its official publication on the P-4 Agreement,
the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) states that "[b]ecause of the low
barriers to trade between the partners to the Trans-Pacific SEP, a key objective of the negotiations,
from the start, was the potential strategic benefits." Id.
12 Open accession provisions are unusual but not unheard of. They are more common amongst
APEC partners than elsewhere. Agreements featuring such provision include the Thailand - New
Zealand FTA; the Thailand - Australia FTA; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the Armenia - Moldova FTA. Within APEC, agreements centred in Oceania all have open
accession provisions; of the agreements centred around the United States, some have open
accession provisions (e.g. the United States - Australia FIA and the United States - Singapore
FTA) but others do not (e.g. the United States - Chile FrA); and among agreements centred in
East Asia, very few FTAs contain open accession provisions. See Christopher M. Dent, Full Circle?
Ideas and Ordeals of Creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, 20(4) THE PACIFIC REVIEW
447,459 (2007).
13 See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: How PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 92-96 (2008).
14 Dent, supra note 12, at 464-66.
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yet over time may accomplish the parties' goal of expanding the
membership and influence of the agreement.
m. PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING THE P-4 AGREEMENT INTO A
BROADER TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
On February 4, 2008, the United States Trade Representative initiated
the process contemplated by the P-4 Agreement's open accession provision,
announcing that the United States would join in negotiations on investment
and financial services set to begin in March between Singapore, Chile, New
Zealand and Brunei. 15 On September 22, 2008, comprehensive negotiations
for the United States to join the Trans-Pacific Agreement were launched.
The first round of negotiations was scheduled to commence in March 2009,
with Australia, Peru and Vietnam also intending to participate in
negotiations from the first round. 16 This first round of negotiations has been
deferred while the new Obama administration conducts a general review of
United States trade policy. However, it seems highly likely that following
its review the Obama administration will elect to pursue these negotiations,
and this article proceeds on that assumption.
The concept of a Pacific FTA did not first occur to the United States
upon seeing the P-4 Agreement; instead, this concept was discussed as
early as 1998 when the United States, Singapore, Chile, Australia and New
Zealand engaged in informal discussions regarding the possibility of
forming a "Pacific-5" free trade agreement. Although these discussions did
not take off at the time due to the United States executive branch's lack of
fast-track negotiating authority and the fact that Australia and Chile were
prioritizing other issues, the idea had been hatched. Out of that idea sprang
the agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic
Partnership (NZSCEP) which entered into force in 2001, and NZSCEP in
turn served as the model for the P-4 Agreement. Thus while the
negotiations to expand the P-4 are of recent origin, the concepts and goals
underlying those negotiations have been in place for some time.
15 Press Release, United States Trade Representative [USTR], United States to Join Sectoral
Negotiations with Four Asia-Pacific Countries Will Explore Participation in Broader Strategic
Partnership Agreement (Feb. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/pdfs/press-release/2008/asset-upload-file86-l445
1.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). The original P-4 Agreement provided that negotiations on
financial services and investment would begin within two years of the entry into force of the
Agreement. Those negotiations commenced in March 2008, with the United States participating
while weighing whether to negotiate its comprehensive accession into the agreement. See generally
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement Between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore,
http:lwww.mfat.govt.nzrTrade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/Trans-
Pacificlindex.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
16 id.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TPP EXPANSION FOR EAST ASIAN
REGIONALISM
A. Regionalism Models
There have been many different proposed models for East Asian
regionalism, but a unified region is far from a reality. There are historical,
cultural, political, and economic reasons why this is the case. Nonetheless,
within the region at present there are a variety of associations, regional
groupings, and FTAs. Among others, there is the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and a multitude of free trade agreements, some between two
Asian countries, others between ASEAN and one other Asian country, and
some that involve one or more Asian countries and one or more parties
from outside the region.
Discussions regarding Asian economic integration offer several
different formulations as potential paths forward for the region. In the early
1990s many expected that APEC would be the mechanism through which
deeper Asian integration would occur. However, due in part to the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s as well as other factors, APEC's role has
diminished over time. During the same period, the Japanese economy
underwent a lengthy period of stagnation while China's economy has
grown exponentially, increasing China's power in the region. However,
China has been cautious about the level of commitments it makes in its free
trade agreements, calling into question the suitability of these agreements
to serve as a basis for forming an eventual FTAAP.
1 7
More recent possibilities raised have included ASEAN+3, whereby
ASEAN would enter into a free trade agreement with China, Japan, and
Korea;' 8 ASEAN+6, which would-see Australia, New Zealand, and India
added to the ASEAN+3 formulation;' 9 and an East Asian Free Trade Area
(comprising China, Japan, and Korea). 20 What is notable about these
proposals is the assumption that the major players will not include the
17 It is of course a separate question as to whether it would be desirable for an FTAAP to be formed.
See, e.g., Dent, supra note 12 at 469-70 (arguing that an FTAAP could destabilize the world
trading system and would perhaps make the WTO appear redundant).
'8 Another possibility is that there will be a series of ASEAN+1 individual agreements, including
with Japan, China, and Korea individually, before there is an ASEAN+3 agreement.19 See, e.g., Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way
Forward?, presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism (Sept. 10-12, 2007),
available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratope/region-e/con-sepO7lelkawai-wignaraja-e.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2009); EDWARD J. LINcOLN, EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC REGIONALISM 140-58
(2004).
2 See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER (CHINA) Er AL., JOINT POLICY REPORT AND
POuCY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AMONG CHINA, JAPAN
AND KOREA (2006).
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United States. Each formulation raises its own balance of power concerns,
but all arising from within the Asian region. For example, ASEAN+3 has
raised some concerns within ASEAN that the balance of power would shift
from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.2'
The ASEAN+6 formulation arose in part to keep the power balance
from shifting north, but also because Japan wanted to include India,
Australia and New Zealand as a counterbalance to China.22 This Asia-only
focus is consistent with the efforts of the last two decades - originally
spearheaded by Malaysia's former Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir - to
develop a collaborative East Asian economic grouping that would by
design exclude the United States.
23
An East Asian FTA would likely see a power shift from South to North
as with ASEAN+3. It could give rise to a world with three major trading
blocs; the Americas, the EU, and East Asia. Critics of regionalism are
particularly concerned by the implications such a tripolar system would
have for the multilateral trading system.24
The TPP expansion may reflect a different path towards Asian
economic integration, one which would in the first instance neither have
ASEAN nor the three major East Asian economies at its core, and which
would instead have the United States as a central participant. If the
expanded TPP becomes the basis for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific
(FTAAP), Asian integration will develop along lines more similar to those
envisioned - even if primarily in an aspirational sense - by the members of
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) than those being
contemplated in the context of ASEAN expansion.
25
Of course it is not a given that TPP expansion will lead to an FTAAP.
Within APEC supporters of an FTAAP include the P-4 Agreement member
26
countries, as well as the United States, Canada, and Taiwan. However,
China, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines all oppose
21 Barry Desker, Prospects for East Asia Community, in CHALLENGES TO TRILATERAL
COOPERATION: THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION TOKYO PLENARY MEETING 2006 66, 66 (Trilateral
Commission ed., 2006).
22 Takashi Terada, Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan-China Power Struggles,
26(1) JAPANESE STUD. 5, 16 (2006).
23 For a discussion of the origins of East Asian regionalism and the formation of APEC, see EAST
ASIAN MULTILATERALISM: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY 5-8 (Kent E. Calder & Francis
Fukuyama eds., 2008).
24See, e.g., Bernard K. Gordon, U.S. Perspectives on East Asian Economic Integration, 31(2) J.
ECON. DEv. 149, 152 (2006).
25 For a discussion of APEC's consideration of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), see
C. Fred Bergsten, Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, presented at a Joint Conference of
the Japan Economic Foundation and Peterson Institute for International Economics on "New Asia-
Pacific Trade Initiatives" (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/ber
gsten1 107.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).26 Dent, supra note 12, at 456.
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27the idea of an V[AAP. The incremental way in which the TPP is going to
expand may force some of the countries in opposition to rethink their
positions. Regardless of whether an FTAAP is the ultimate outcome, an
expanded TPP will affect the APEC countries that are not members.
B. China
The implications of an expanded TPP for the region are significant.
With respect to China, an expanded TPP could diminish China's ability to
set its own trade agreement agenda. China's FTA policy has been
somewhat inconsistent, with agreements of differing ambition and detail.
China formed a free trade agreement with ASEAN that took effect in
2003. 28 This Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation (FACEC) is intended to lead to a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
with different subject coverage and effectiveness dates for different
ASEAN members. 9 The earliest benchmark is to negotiate an FTA on
trade in goods with the so-called ASEAN 6 (the original six members of
ASEAN - Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) to be in place by 2010 and a similar agreement for the remaining,
less-developed ASEAN members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
by 2015.30 The details of the FTA - including the scope of goods covered
and the rules of origin to apply - were not elaborated upon in the
Framework Agreement but instead left to future negotiations. Perhaps with
the exception of its FTA with New Zealand, China's FTAs - the one with
ASEAN included - are generall viewed as being largely political in nature
and of low economic quality. 3 China has not been particularly active in
attempting to spur on the Doha Round of WTO negotiations and has
expressed scepticism about the APEC FTAAP concept; the latter possibly
32because of Taiwan's inclusion in APEC for economic purposes.
27 id.
28 The members of ASEAN negotiated an FTA amongst themselves - known as the ASEAN Free
Trade Area or AFTA - in 1992. Tariff elimination amongst the original six members of ASEAN
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) is scheduled to be completed
by 2010, and by 2015 for the newer four members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam).
' For commentary on the China-ASEAN F1'A (FACEC), see generally CHINA-ASEAN
RELATIONS: ECONOMiC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS (John Wong et al. eds., 2006).
3' For a discussion of the formation of the FACEC, see Zeng Huaqun, WTO Rules and China-
ASEAN FTA Agreement, in CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS 93,
93-94 (John Wong et al. eds., 2006); Qingjiang Kong, China's WTO Accession and the ASEAN
China Free Trade Area: The Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer, 7(4) J. INT'L ECON. L. 839, 852
n.30 (2004).
31 Bergsten, supra note 25, at 4. For a discussion of the variation amongst China's agreements, see
Agata Antkiewicz & John Whalley, China's New Regional Trade Agreements (Can. Agric. Trade
Pol'y Res. Network, Working Paper 2004-1, Nov. 2004), available at http://www.uoguelph.ca/--cat
prn/PDF/Working%20Paper%202004-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).32 Bergsten, supra note 25, at 4.
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If the TPP expansion proceeds, China will no longer be in as good a
position to control whether an FTAAP is created, and concomitantly may
have less control over the participation of Taiwan, should the inclusion of
all APEC members become more likely. Alternatively it may be the case
that the TPP will morph into an FTAAP but with APEC members not all
acceding at once.3 3 Nonetheless, if the FTAAP arises out of an expanded
TPP, China's ability to control the agenda will be diminished. That said,
should China choose to make the requisite levels of commitments, it will be
well-placed to join the expanded TP as it already has FTAs itself with
New Zealand, Chile, and effectively with Singapore by virtue of its FTA
with ASEAN.
C. Japan
Japan currently has FTAs with P-4 members Singapore and Brunei. It
also has a number of other FTAs with Asian countries, as well as an
agreement with ASEAN as of 2008. As with China, an expanded TPP
would likely reduce Japan's ability to establish the breadth and depth of its
FTA commitments. Japan would likely have some difficulties in acceding
to an expanded TPP due to the high level of commitments in agriculture
that would be expected. Japan may therefore ultimately find itself in a
difficult position of having to decide whether to accede to an agreement
that differs from its preferred FTA model, or to instead stay outside of an
agreement that could end up comprising a very significant percentage of
world trade.
D. Korea
Korea's regional position could be enhanced relative to the other East
Asian powers Japan and China, should UPP expansion proceed. Korea and
the United States have negotiated an FTA that now awaits approval from
the United States Congress. Should that approval be forthcoming - which
is not a given, as the Obama Administration is substantively reviewing the
pending agreements negotiated by the Bush Administration - Korea would
be in a good position to accede to the TPP. By virtue of having reached
agreement with the United States already on the issues the U.S. prioritizes,
it would presumably find it easier to reach commonality with the expanded
TP partners than would either Japan or China. However, should the
33 Bergsten, supra note 25, at 11. Sheng Bin predicts that China might not initially join an FTAAP,
but might join at a later time. See generally Sheng Bin, The Political Economy of an Asia Pacific
Free Trade Area: A China Perspective, in AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE POLmcAL ECONOMY
OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE ASIA PACIFIC 53 (Charles Edward Morrison & Eduardo Pedrosa
eds., 2007).
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current P-4 members succeed in keeping the coverage of the agreement
comprehensive, Korea will - like Japan - have difficulties agreeing to the
agricultural liberalization that may be required of it.
E. ASEAN
As signalled above, TPP expansion will likely result in a somewhat
diminished regional role for ASEAN as an association. Many of the
members of ASEAN - particularly those that are WTO members - may
find it appealing and not overly challenging to accede to the TPP.
Singapore and Brunei are already a part of the P-4, and Vietnam is entering
the TPP negotiations at the ground floor. Thailand has FTAs with New
Zealand and new participants Australia and Peru, so would also be a likely
country to join the agreement sooner rather than later, notwithstanding its
overall lack of support for an FTAAP. On the other hand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Malaysia have fewer institutional links to the P-4 partners
aside from their ASEAN ties. As an association, ASEAN is facing pressure
from some of its members to defer the implementation dates of the ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement due to the global economic crisis. 34 It is thus not in
the strongest position to lead a broadened regional undertaking; and with
the involvement of the United States, will likely have less of a role in
setting terms in any case.
F. The United States
The decision of the United States to negotiate to join the TPP was a
very savvy one, and as noted above reflects a longer history of seeking to
create a Pacific free trade agreement. By joining the TPP the U.S. will not
only ensure it is not excluded from an enlarged Asian regional agreement,
but will also cement its ability to be a leader in setting the terms of any
future FTAAP. Instead of a world with three major economic blocs - the
Americas, Europe, and East Asia - in which the American bloc likely
would not be the most economically powerful of the three, there would
instead be a world with two blocs. Europe would represent one of these
blocs, and the Asia-Pacific, defined broadly to include Asia, the United
States, Oceania, and much of South America, the other. By virtue of
joining the TPP at this early stage, the United States is improving its
prospects of controlling the regional power balance and of securing its
position in what may expand to become the stronger of two power blocs as
34 Marianne V. Go, RP Seeks Delay in ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Mar.
23, 2009, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=451001 (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
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opposed to placing itself in the second or third position out of three more
equally-weighted blocs.
V. TPP EXPANSION AND MULTILATERALISM: STUMBLING BLOCK
OR STEPPING STONE?
A. General Critique of FTAs
In addition to the implications an expanded TPP will have for Asian
regionalism and economic integration, it will also have implications for the
broader multilateral trading system. As a general matter free trade
agreements are often seen as a bane rather than a boon for the multilateral
trade agenda. Although the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on
their face only permit FTAs that cover substantially all the trade between
the parties to an agreement, 35 in practice the WTO has not been able to
effectively monitor FTAs and the vast majority of agreements enter into
force notwithstanding the fact that they almost certainly do not satisfy the
"substantially all the trade" requirement, regardless of how one defines that
term. While there is some debate over whether comprehensive FTAs are a
positive in that they chip away at trade barriers to a degree, or a negative in
that they are discriminatory and undermine the ability to make progress
multilaterally, it is widely believed that agreements that are not
comprehensive - i.e. do not comply with the "substantially all the trade"
requirement - are more likely to be stumbling blocks to further multilateral
trade liberalization than stepping stones.36 If WTO members reach bilateral
agreements that liberalize certain sectors but leave sensitive sectors
protected, it makes it all the harder to then negotiate reductions in trade
barriers in those sensitive sectors in the context of WTO negotiating rounds,
because there is less available to "give" in exchange for making the
remaining, most difficult concessions. 37 The United States has been a
35 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 LL.M. 1125 (1994).
36 For a recent comprehensive critique of FrAs, see BHAGWATI, supra note 13. While GAT
Article XXIV-compliant FTAs can lead to a degree of trade diversion (see, e.g., JACOB VtNER, THE
CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 44 (1950)), this is less likely to be an issue for open-access FI'As such as
the P-4 Agreement See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Rules, Background Note by the Secretariat:
Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements: Background Note by the Secretariat
(Revision), at 27, TN/RL/W/8/Rev/1 (Aug. 1, 2002). ("[T]he lack of flexible accession provisions
in many RTAs hampers their effectiveness in contributing to the growth of world trade .... ").
37 See generally Nuno Limbo, Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral
Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States, 96(3) AM. ECON. REv. 896 (2006) (finding
that FrAs have impeded multilateral trade liberalization); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners'
Dilemma and Free Trade Agreements: An Application of Game Theory to Trade Liberalization
Strategy, in CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL
AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 21 (Laurence Boulle et al. eds., 2008); see also Thomas Cottier, The
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strong proponent in recent years of the theory of "competitive
liberalization", whereby it is believed that the creation of FFAs will serve
as a catalyst to spur progress in the multilateral negotiation setting.
However, there is doubt whether competitive liberalization will be the
result of increasing FFAs, as the process of harmonizing FTAs will be
38difficult given the disparate provisions and standards used. There thus
may be uneasiness that TPP expansion will just be another example of a
subset of WTO members devoting energies to negotiations other than the
WTO's fraught Doha Round, with the result that it will become even more
difficult to make progress in the multilateral setting.
B. Will the TPP Take the Shape of the U.S. FTA Template?
One concern that may arise as a result of the United States entering the
TPP negotiations is whether the Agreement will morph from its current
coverage to look more like the fairly uniform United States free trade
agreements. The U.S. agreements are sufficiently similar in certain respects
that there is often reference to a "U.S. template" agreement and to "cookie
cutter" provisions. Some of the common provisions in the United States
FrAs have been the subject of a variety of criticisms. 39 The heightened
intellectual property provisions, often referred to as "TRIPS-Plus"
provisions, have particularly raised concerns about affordable access to
medicines and other health issues.40
The political reality for the existing members of the P-4 is that the
United States will likely be able to dictate the terms of the expanded
agreement both because of its overall negotiating strength and by virtue of
the terms it has already negotiated in its free trade agreements with P-4
Erosion of Non-Discrimination: Stern Warning Without True Remedies, 8(3) J. INT'L ECON. L 595,
597 (2005) (noting problem of noncompliant FTAs as stumbling blocks); Meredith Kolsky Lewis,
The Free Trade Agreement Paradox, 21 N.Z. UNIv. L. REv. 554, 557-59 (2005).
38 See, e.g., Dent, supra note 12, at 467; BHAGWATI, supra note 13, at 82-85.
39 See, e.g., Andrew D. Mitchell, The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, in
CHALLENGES TO MULTLATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS (Laurence Boulle et a]. eds., 2008).
40 See, e.g., Thomas A. Faunce et al., The Trans-Tasman Therapeutic Products Authority: Potential
A USFTA Impacts on Safety and Cost-Effectiveness Regulation for Medicines and Medical Devices
in New Zealand, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 365 (2006); Prabodh Malhotra & Bhajan
Grewal, TRIPS-Plus: Free Trade Agreements Jeopardizing Public Health in Developing Nations,
in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ASIA (Tran Van Hoa & Charles Harvie eds., 2008); Thomas
A. Faunce & Joel Lexchin, "Linkage" Pharmaceutical Evergreening in Canada and Australia, 4(8)
AuSTL. & N.Z. HEALTH POL'Y (2007), available at http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/l/8
(last visited Sept. 23, 2009); Bryan Mercurio, The Impact of the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement on the Provision of Health Services in Australia, 26 WHITIER L. REv. 1051
(2005); Robert Chalmers, Evergreen or Deciduous? Australian Trends in Relation to the
"Evergreening " of Patents, 30 MELB U. L. REv. 29 (2006); Anna Kingsbury, Intellectual Property
Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements: What Should New Zealand Expect
from a New Zealand/United States Free Trade Agreement?, 10 N.Z. BuS. L.Q. 222 (2004).
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partners Chile and Singapore.41 Adding Australia and Peru to the
negotiations makes this even more likely, as the U.S. has FTAs with these
42
countries as well. Oona Hathaway has explained this phenomenon in
terms of sequencing path dependence: "The power to set the agenda can
thus become, in a very real sense, the power to determine the result. 43 It is
unclear how much push back, if any, the P-4 partners will attempt. New
Zealand has been anxious to enter into an FTA with the United States for
several years, but has not attracted the U.S.'s interest until now. Having
seen the concessions Australia made in its FTA with the United States,
New Zealand has a good understanding of what the U.S. is likely to
demand, and is presumably willing to accept those consequences. That said,
the P-4 members have consciously negotiated an agreement that has
comprehensive coverage, particularly with respect to trade in goods. The
members may push hard to maintain the coverage of agriculture for
example, though it seems likely the U.S. would insist at a minimum on
lengthy phase out periods for the most sensitive agricultural products.
C. TPP as Stepping Stone?
While the United States may have significant sway in dictating the
terms of the TPP to the extent there are new sectoral commitments (as in
the recent financial services and investment negotiations), the P-4
Agreement itself already contains significant liberalization commitments
which it seems likely the United States would have to commit to as a
condition of accession. Even if these commitments are made in exchange
for TRIPS-plus provisions and other concessions, the current partners -
particularly New Zealand - would stand to benefit significantly.
As noted above, the P-4 Agreement is already highly comprehensive in
its coverage. Unlike many FTAs it does not have major carve outs for
agricultural products and instead provides for liberalization of sectors such
as dairy which many countries have traditionally protected. 44 Indeed the
41 The U.S.-Singapore FTA and the U.S.-Chile FTA both came into effect on January 1, 2004.
42 The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) entered into force on January 1, 2005.
The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (U.S.-Pem TPA) entered into force on February 1,
2009.
43 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 618-19 (2000-2001). See also Jane Rennie,
Competition Provisions in Free Trade Agreements: Unique Responses to Bilateral Needs or
Derivative Developments in International Competition Policy, 15(2) INT. TRADE L. & REG. 57, 71
(2009) (noting path-dependent nature of bilateral FTA provisions whereby terms become a
reflection of common practice rather than the particular needs of the parties). As an example of this,
in the case of pharmaceuticals protection the United States has negotiated similar terms to the
AUSFTA provisions in its FTA with Korea.
44 Many of the EU's F1As include significant exclusions for agricultural products and likely fall
afoul of the "substantially all" requirements of Article XXIV. See, e.g., James Famsworth, United
States Department of Agriculture GAIN Report: EU-25 Trade Policy Monitoring, Least Favored
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United States tends to carve dairy commitments largely out of its FrAs.
New Zealand in particular would reap substantial gains if the United States
accession includes commitments on dairy liberalization in accordance with
the commitments already made by the existing P-4 members. This would
result in far more comprehensive market access to the United States for
New Zealand's dairy products than New Zealand could ever have hoped to
have negotiated in the bilateral context (assuming that the United States
had ever become interested in a bilateral FrA with New Zealand, which is
a big if). It remains to be seen how hard the P-4 members will try to require
the U.S. to liberalize dairy and other sensitive sectors. However, while
these are difficult domestic political issues for the United States, if the U.S.
is thinking strategically about positioning the TPP as a model for an
FTAAP, it may be willing to make new concessions in agriculture in hopes
that the payoff will ultimately be that Japan, Korea, and other APEC
economies will accede to these terms as well in the future.
Now that the United States has entered the expansion discussions, the
agreement is on track to encompass a broader range of commitments, with
coverage extended to financial services and investment. To the extent the
expanded agreement is likely to serve as the model for a Free Trade Area of
the Asia-Pacific, it is a positive that the coverage, already broad, is going to
become even more comprehensive.
In addition, the fact that the Agreement contains an open accession
provision will facilitate its expansion to include more and more countries.
Already a queue of interested parties is developing, and it is useful that the
Agreement already has procedures in place for incorporating new members.
While open accession provisions have featured prominently in New
Zealand's FFAs and in a number of other agreements, it is interesting to
note that Taiwan has proposed that it be a WTO requirement that FTAs
contain such provisions.4 5
In the past some have suggested that the P-4 could serve as a "dock"
for other interested APEC members, with there being resultant scepticism
that the P-4 "is clearly too small provide a foundation for APEC-wide
arrangements." 46 Whether this critique is accurate or not for the P-4 as
currently configured, it is evident that adding the United States to the
Nation: Impact of EU Trade Agreements on US Agriculture 2005, http:l/www.fas.usda.gov/gainfile
s1200504/146119474.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). Japan's FrAs with Singapore and Mexico
similarly exclude a wide range of agricultural products. See Jayant Menon, Bilateral Trade
Agreements and the World Trading System, http'//www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=6528
(last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
45 See generally Paper by the Separate Custom Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu,
Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, TN/RIJW/186 (Aug. 3, 2005); see also the discussion in Matthew Paul
Schaefer, Ensuring that Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: US
Unilateralism a Supplement to WTO Initiatives?, 10(3) J. INT'L ECON. L 585, 595 (2007).
4 Bergsten, supra note 25, at 14 n.16.
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grouping (and to a lesser extent, Australia, Peru and possibly Vietnam)
alters the analysis considerably. It in fact seems quite likely that if the
negotiations proceed and the United States, Australia, Peru and Vietnam
join, there will quickly be many other countries in the Asia-Pacific region
clamouring to join as well.
The combination of a high standards, comprehensive agreement with
an open accession provision and the United States as a party is a heady
prospect. Countries will want to join this agreement, and doing so will
require very significant liberalization commitments. As a result, it is
possible that the TPP will lead ultimately to an FTAAP. If continued
agreement can be reached on rules of origin and other issues that tend to
render FTAs inconsistent with one another and create the infamous
spaghetti bowl of clashing commitments, there may even be a prospect that
the FTAAP could drive progress in the Doha Round rather than hinder it.
As a general proposition I believe that FTAs are stumbling blocks in the
path of multilateral trade liberalization. And competitive liberalization
seems unlikely to materialize as a result of the proliferation of the usual
non-comprehensive FTAs. However, comprehensive, open accession
agreements may provide the best possibility to prove the exception to the
rule as they provide a more realistic opportunity to "multilateralize"
regionalism. 47 This could particularly take hold in the APEC context where
open regionalism has long been a central tenet, even if never fully
defined.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion of the P-4 Agreement into a Trans-Pacific Partnership
that includes the United States may serve as the template agreement for an
ultimate Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. The decision by the United
States to seek to join the TPP is a savvy move as it will give the U.S. a role
in shaping what is likely to become the most important trade agreement in
the Asia-Pacific - and if it ultimately becomes the basis for an FTAAP (or
even just a significantly-expanded agreement) perhaps in the world. In
47 See generally Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27(1) Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39
(2006); Joost Pauwelyn, Legal Avenues to "Multilateralizing Regionalism": Beyond Article XXIV,
presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism (Sept. 10-12, 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region-e/con-sep07_elpauwelyn-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,
2009). See also Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism and the WTO: Should the Rules be Changed?, in
THE WTO AND RECIPROCAL PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 490,494 (Caroline Freund
ed., 2007) ("[D]ynamics of regional groups that are open to all newcomers will differ from those of
exclusive or selective ones.").
48 E.g. Srikanta Chattejee, Regionalism, Open Regionalism, the APEC and the WTO: An Economic
Perspective from New Zealand (Dep't of Applied and Int'l Econ., Massey Univ., Discussion Paper
No. 99.03, April 1999), available at http://econ.massey.ac.nzlpublications/discuss/dp99-03.pdf
(last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
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addition, it will put the United States in a strong position relative to the EU
should the agreement expand to include the major Asian economies. The
inclusion of the United States is also of potential importance as the U.S.
may serve as a counterweight to the other potential regional kingpins, Japan
and China. The TPP expansion also has significant implications for the
WTO.
While FTAs generally undermine the goal of multilateral trade
liberalization because they usually do not comply with the GATT Article
XXIV mandate of covering "substantially all" the trade between the
agreement members, the P-4 Agreement, with its open accession provision
and broad coverage, may have more potential than most agreements to
serve as a stepping stone rather than a stumbling block, at least towards
increased regional liberalization. In the multilateral context an expanded
TPP could result in renewed commitment to Doha by countries not party to
the TPP. However, there is also the risk that a very strong regional
grouping may serve to marginalize the importance of the WTO for TPP
members. Regardless of the outcome, it seems clear that as the P-4 expands
into the TPP, it will be an agreement that significantly influences regional
and multilateral trade liberalization dynamics.
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